习近平大打？中打？小打？台海风云突变｜Xi Jinping: Major Strike? Moderate Strike? Minor Strike?

Deskripsi:

成为此频道的会员即可获享以下福利： 习近平重大转变：台海：大打？中打？小打？ 朋友们大家好，欢迎大家回到老杜的《内部视角看中国》。 两岸问题，向来是中国政治语境中最敏感、也最被精密控制的议题之一。无论谁当政，北京在涉台表述上的用词，历来都是层层把关、反复推敲，甚至逐字逐句过会研究，极少出现情绪化、即兴式的公开表态。正因为如此，2025 年 12 月 31 日，习近平在 2026 年新年贺词中的那句话，才显得格外刺眼、也格外危险。他一改过去反复强调的“和平统一”与“最大诚意”，而是直接抛出一句极具政治指向性的表述—— “两岸同胞血浓于水，祖国统一的历史大势不可阻挡。” 几乎在同一时间，东部战区突然展开针对台湾的围台实弹射击演习。请注意，在中国，能够调动军队、下达这种级别军事动作指令的人，只有一个——习近平本人。这是一套极其典型的“文攻武吓”：一边在最高政治场合用语言定调，一边用军事实弹制造现实压力。语言叫嚣与武力示强同步出现，本身就已经构成了一个极其危险的信号。 更关键的是，这句话的真正含义，远远不是字面上的“民族亲情”。“血浓于水”并不是温情叙事，而是政治化的族群绑定。它不是民族情感的回归，而是以“血缘回归”为名，对台湾社会发出的武力征服与政治吞并的出征号角。这标志着北京对台政策，正在发生一次结构性转向——从过去的“模糊威慑＋长期拖延统战”，转向“政治定调＋时间压力”。 说得再直白一点：在习近平的主观判断中，“统一问题”已经不再是一个可以无限期搁置的战略选项，而是被提升为一个必须在其任内完成的政治任务。这一点，对于本就高度紧张、脆弱的两岸关系而言，无异于风云突变。 而这一转向，并不是孤立发生的。 老杜在此前的节目中已经多次提到一个极其关键、但外界严重低估的背景，当然这是老杜获得非常可靠的独家内部信息：习近平在二十大之后，曾向全军各部队——注意，是全军，而不是某一个战区——下达了针对“武力收复台湾”的作战训练与准备考核目标。原本的时间节点，是 2026 年底；但到 2025 年底，这一考核被提前“完成交卷”。 这意味着什么？意味着在一个从未打过仗、几乎不懂军事的最高统帅眼中，对台作战的“准备条件”已经具备。他是否真的具备，是另一回事；但在他的认知结构里，这件事已经被画上了完成符号。 再叠加一个更具个人色彩、也更危险的背景。 一个多月前，被判处死刑、缓期两年执行的原内蒙古自治区副主席王波，曾向老杜透露：他亲耳听一位政治局常委级别的老领导转述，习近平在一次中央政治局会议上直言不讳地说过——“我知道，现在党内外有一些同志，希望我按时下车，把权力交给年轻人。但我告诉你们，我的历史使命尚未完成。假如我今天能够收回台湾，明天我就会退休，颐养天年。” 朋友们，把这三条背景放在一起看，你会发现一个极其危险的轮廓正在成形： 政治定调已经完成，军事准备在他眼中已经“达标”，而个人历史使命又被高度绑定在“收回台湾”这一件事情上。表面看起来，习近平似乎已经走到了“箭在弦上，不得不发”的状态。 Xi Jinping’s Major Shift: Taiwan Strait—A Big War? Medium War? Small War? Greetings, friends. Welcome back to Lao Du’s Inside Perspective on China. The cross-strait issue has always been one of the most sensitive and tightly controlled topics in China’s political discourse. Regardless of who holds power, Beijing’s rhetoric on Taiwan is always carefully vetted and meticulously crafted, often studied word by word in high-level meetings. Rarely does one see emotional or impromptu public statements. It is precisely for this reason that Xi Jinping’s words on December 31, 2025, in his 2026 New Year’s address, appeared especially jarring—and especially dangerous. He departed from his usual repeated emphasis on “peaceful reunification” and “utmost sincerity,” and instead delivered a politically charged statement: “The blood of compatriots on both sides of the Strait is thicker than water; the historical tide of national reunification cannot be stopped.” Almost simultaneously, the Eastern Theater Command suddenly launched live-fire exercises encircling Taiwan. Take note: in China, there is only one person with the authority to mobilize the military and issue such high-level operational commands—Xi Jinping himself. This is a classic model of “verbal pressure paired with military intimidation”: on one hand, setting the tone with language in the highest political setting; on the other, creating real-world pressure through live military action. The simultaneous appearance of rhetorical belligerence and military posturing in itself constitutes an extremely dangerous signal. More crucially, the real meaning of that statement goes far beyond the literal phrase of “familial bonds.” “Blood is thicker than water” is not a sentimental narrative—it is a politicized form of ethnic binding. It is not a return to ethnic sentiment, but a clarion call for military conquest and political annexation of Taiwanese society under the guise of “bloodline reunification.” This marks a structural shift in Beijing’s Taiwan policy—from the previous model of “ambiguous deterrence + long-term united front” to a new model of “political tone-setting + time pressure.” To put it even more bluntly: in Xi Jinping’s subjective judgment, the “reunification issue” is no longer a strategic option that can be indefinitely postponed. It has been elevated to a political task that must be completed within his term. For the already tense and fragile cross-strait relationship, this is nothing short of a dramatic upheaval. And this shift is not happening in isolation. In earlier episodes, Lao Du has repeatedly pointed to a critical—yet gravely underestimated—background, based on very reliable exclusive insider information: after the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping issued operational training and readiness assessment targets for “military reunification with Taiwan” to all units of the armed forces—note, not just a specific theater command, but the entire military. The original timeline for this was the end of 2026. But by the end of 2025, the assessment was prematurely “completed and submitted.” What does this mean? It means that in the eyes of a supreme commander who has never fought a war and knows little about military affairs, the “preparation conditions” for war against Taiwan have already been met. Whether or not they truly have is another matter; but in his cognitive framework, the matter has already been checked off. Now add another, more personal—and more dangerous—background to the picture.